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Online user activities are tracked for many purposes. In e-commerce, cross-domain tracking is
used to quantify and pay for web-tra±c generation. Our previous research studies have shown
that HTTP cookie-based tracking process, though reliable, can fail due to technical reasons, as
well as through fraudulent manipulation by tra±c generators. In this research study, we
evaluate which of the previously published tracking mechanisms are still functional. We assess
the e±cacy and utility of those methods to create a robust tracking mechanism for e-commerce.
A failsafe and robust tracking mechanism does not need to translate into further privacy
intrusions. Many countries are rushing to introduce new regulations, which can have a negative
impact on the development of robust technologies in an inherently stateless eco-system. We
used a multi-domain, purpose-built simulation environment to experiment common tracking
scenarios, and to describe the parameters that de¯ne the minimum tracking requirement use-
cases, and practices that result in invading privacy of users. This study will help practitioners in
their implementations, and policy developers and regulators to draw up policies that would not
curtail the development of robust tracking technologies that are needed in e-commerce activi-
ties, while safeguarding the privacy of internet users.
Keywords: Cross-domain; tracking; a±liate marketing; HTTP cookie; XDT.
1. Introduction
While HTTP cookies have been providing reliable tracking capabilities for over two
decades,1 previous research studies have exposed underlying issues where HTTP
cookie-based tracking mechanism can fail.2 There are also instances where fraudulent
parties can manipulate tracking systems to falsify tracking data,3–5 usually for
monetary gain. In recent years research ¯ndings have presented alternative methods
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for state management, speci¯cally those that can be extended as tracking meth-
ods.6–11 Traditional tracking methods such as HTTP cookies, which have been
speci¯cally developed to manage state, have been in use for tracking for a long time
and are likely to remain usable even in the future. Any future developments can be
expected to remain backward compatible or further enhanced, as they are meant for
state management purpose. In contrary, the newer alternative methods presented in
recent research studies may usually have a shorter lifespan and cannot be guaranteed
to be usable over time. As those technologies evolve to serve their intended purposes
in future, they can lose their usability as a tracking method. In this research, we
examined some of the newer tracking methods presented in previous studies and
tested their current usability and whether they can complement existing technologies
to improve the robustness of the tracking process within an e-commerce environ-
ment. That would mean an improved and fail-safe cross-domain tracking capability
for e-commerce.
Nevertheless, an improved robustness and accuracy, may appear to be a more
persistent and privacy invasive threat, in the minds of some privacy advocates.
Online tracking is fast becoming synonymous with stalking, with increasing number
of countries rushing to introduce plethora of new privacy laws. Adhering to multi-
tude of regional and country speci¯c privacy laws on the Internet where physical
borders are obscure, and compliance with such regulations is not only di±cult, but
also is somewhat defeating the purpose of such privacy concerns.12 New research
¯ndings suggest General Data Protection Regulation.13 (GDPR) introduced by
European Union as recently as May 2018, does not achieve its intended purpose, due
to click-fatigue.14 While it is important to protect the privacy of internet users, it is
equally important to develop and maintain robust mechanisms to maintain state in a
traditionally stateless ecosystem, across geographically distributed multiple
domains, making e-commerce activities reliable. Therefore, it necessitates identifying
and categorizing di®erent use-cases of cross-domain user tracking on the internet.
Such tracking practices span from a purely technological necessity in one end to
person-identifying and data-marketing endeavors at the opposite extremity. This
segmentation enables practitioners and regulators to de¯ne and adhere to regulations
and best practices, that would e®ectively curb privacy intrusions without unintended
consequences of technological curtailments. This paper examines di®erent technol-
ogies that may be used to strengthen the online tracking process, thereby also ver-
ifying which of the previously presented technologies are still usable for tracking
purpose today, with current developments in technology. Then, it examines di®erent
use-cases of online tracking and categorizes them into levels of privacy intrusion
involved and levels of indispensability in terms of a technical necessity. Finally, this
paper presents how improved and more reliable online tracking techniques can en-
hance e-commerce activity without compromising privacy of internet users when
used purely as an underlying technology. This paper also reveals which techniques
have what levels of intrusions, when combined with Person Identifying Information
(PII). This knowledge will provide clarity to policy developers and legislature to




























































































formulate e®ective and consistent regulations and policies without undermining the
technical necessities of legitimate e-commerce activities. It will also facilitate prac-
titioners to de¯ne boundaries in their implementations. Importantly, the scienti¯c
community can extend this research to develop technological solutions and frame-
works that can automate machine-to-machine negotiation processes, protocols and
standards between client and server while adhering to privacy guidelines, thus
eliminating human intervention that leads to \click-fatigue".14
The topic related to \Improving the robustness of the tracking process" was
discussed in our previous paper presented at ACIIDS 2020 conference.15 This paper
extends our discussion further with privacy concerns that are associated with online
tracking, in the given context.
2. Related Literature
Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) is stateless by design. Application \state" is
not maintained between calls to an HTTP server and every call is considered a new
request. With the development of the Internet and e-commerce activities, a mech-
anism to manage state was required, and HTTP-cookie was introduced.1 Using
hidden ¯elds on the page and embedding parameters within the request URL are
some of the other state management methods used. Most e-commerce applications
need a persistent state management mechanism, as it is vital to \remember" choices
that individual customers make, and information that they enter into web forms, as
they navigate through webpages on a site, before they submit the form to complete a
transaction. Saving the customer's choice of language, currency type and other fre-
quently used choices beyond that single transaction and using them to pre-¯ll a form
enhances customer satisfaction. While customers gain a positive user experience,
businesses gain the ability to transform behavioral data that can re°ect customer
habits and preferences, which are then used for targeted marketing and business
analytics. We present scenarios which will enable practitioners and regulators to
de¯ne boundaries between user experience, technical necessity and privacy intrusion.
With the introduction of \Local Storage"11 with HTML5, another reliable mech-
anism that can store data locally within a client browser has been made available to
web applications.6,10,11 As a client-side technology, the web server cannot interact with
the \Local Storage" directly; all interactions are managed by JavaScript. Usually, a
unique identi¯er for each visitor is stored in the \Local Storage", that allows the web
server to recall the customer related information stored in the web server, using this
unique identi¯er. \Local Storage" can be used as a tracking mechanism, though it is
less versatile than a HTTP-cookie, not being intended for the tracking purpose.9,16
With the introduction of \ETag" as a web cache validation mechanism,17 it was
discovered that ETags too can be used as a tracking mechanism.6
Existing literature shows that Flash-cookie or the local storage of an adobe °ash
application, o±cially named \Local shared objects" has also been successfully used in
the past as a \super-cookie"; it is considered to be almost indestructible as it is not




























































































managed by the browser and has been used to re-spawn deleted HTTP cookies.6,9,10
As per literature, blocking of HTTP-cookies on the browser, deleting of cookies,
browser cache or browsing history did not have any e®ect on the Flash-cookie. Even
switching to \in-private" browsing could not disable it either, as it is not part of the
browser infrastructure. Its purpose was to provide \Local Storage" to Adobe Flash
applications.
2.1. Cross-domain tracking
Cross-domain tracking (XDT) involves tracking user-interactions across multiple
web domains that may be geographically distributed and owned by di®erent entities
that do not communicate directly with each other. XDT capabilities are useful for
di®erent purposes. Generating network tra±c today, happens across multiple web-
sites. A user may click on a product that appear on one website, that causes the
visitor to arrive at the e-commerce site that sells the product. In between, the tra±c
moves through an intermediary site that records and keeps track of the source and
destination of the tra±c, as the e-commerce site must pay the source for tra±c
generation. There can be many intermediaries involved in one e-commerce trans-
action, where each intermediary needs to be rewarded.5,18–21 Hence this kind of
tracking is a technical necessity, as an underlying technology used in di®erent
e-commerce activities.22 Such tracking capability is achieved using \Cookies" or
similar methods, that can store a small amount of data to identify a web-user
uniquely, which does not capture Personally Identi¯able Information (PII), which
therefore is usually not considered to be a privacy threat. The unique identi¯er is
usually a long number or a GUID. The same tracking method can also be used to
track web-users for multiple other reasons by commercial and governmental entities.
They may capture online behavioral data that is combined with PII to create
comprehensive user pro¯les that invade the privacy of users, without their explicit
permission. As both PII and non-PII-based tracking use similar technologies to
capture data, regulations that restrict usage of such techniques (e.g. using HTTP
cookies) can adversely a®ect scenarios that use tracking only as an underlying
technology to manage state.
Some online tracking scenarios are as follows:
. A±liate marketing model, which is one of the most cost-e±cient online marketing
methods available to e-marketing practitioners. It needs the capability to track
visitors who are viewing and clicking on advertisements placed on a±liates'
websites.23–26 The tracking mechanism traces clicks and successful outcomes; and
pays commissions to a±liates.
. Another usage is for customization web content and personalization of adver-
tisement based on a visitor's historical browsing data.27 Without this capability,
internet users can feel hassled, when products and services that do not even
vaguely interest them, appear at most of the websites they visit.28 Also, the




























































































advertisers will be wasting their marketing budget on audiences that do not yield
them any positive outcomes.
. Customer behavioral data within an e-commerce site (e.g. duration spent on site
and on speci¯c pages, products perused, success rate, etc.) are useful for a mar-
keter, and can be easily generated within the e-commerce application. By sub-
scribing to an external business analytics provider, such data can be combined
with customer demographics obtained through insights over interactions beyond
the boundaries of the practitioner, to generate richer person-pro¯les useful for a
marketeer.18
. Security establishments use tracking technology to identify people who are deemed
a security threat. They are °agged across multitude of websites and their activities
are monitored.
. Third party companies such as Cambridge Analytica pro¯les people with the help
of people's social media a±liations and interests. By using such pro¯ling methods,
they are capable of undertaking nefarious activities such as in°uencing and cre-
ating biased opinions to manipulate political and election outcomes in many
countries around the globe.29
2.2. Privacy concerns related to online tracking
Most web tra±c generation methods involve a minimum of three web domains. For
example, organic or paid searches (e.g. with Google) would involve the Google do-
main, an e-commerce domain, and the visitor domain. Apart from online tra±c
generation endeavors, business analytics and customer demographic data services
also require XDT capability.30 Usually e-marketing services gather behavioral data
on customers, such as origin of the tra±c, total vs. successful visit counts, products
perused by customer, time duration spent on di®erent pages and other customer
demographic information that helps marketers to target marketing campaigns to
speci¯c audiences. They also provide helpful insights for a marketeer to understand if
the customer needs are met by their product o®erings.
If the tracking process is carried out by the e-commerce practitioner in-house,
then the available visitor information is limited to the interactions within practi-
tioner's own domain. But as third-party tracking service providers o®er services to
many e-commerce sites, they can o®er additional information for a premium price.
Such information could include, e.g. which website did the visitor arrive from, which
website did the visitor go to or what products were perused in previous sites, among
other useful information. Some service providers o®er remarketing leads by using the
information they have gathered in competitor sites that have subscribed to the same
tracking service. Using a tracking service provider expands the accessibility scope of
visitor data but is still limited to those e-commerce sites that have subscribed to the
same tracking service provider.
The hierarchical nature of the information access capability of various service
providers enables information exploitation to occur at di®erent degrees. As one




























































































traverses up the hierarchical tree, service providers sitting at a higher level have
increasingly wider visibility. Services at the top of the hierarchy have visibility over
the largest number of node sites. Almost every internet user utilizes some form of a
service provided by at least one of the largest global service providers such as Google,
Facebook, Microsoft, Apple or similar tech giants. Often a person may be using
services of all or most of the above tech giants. Being on top of the hierarchical tree,
they have visibility of user-interaction over most of the internet.31 To use services
provided by these tech giants, one needs to create a user pro¯le with personally
identi¯able information and sign-in with a user account. A cookie that is placed into
the site-visitor's web browser during the sign-in process will identify the visitor
uniquely across all services o®ered by these tech giants and at numerous other
seemingly independent websites. Often the presence of these tech giants is not di-
rectly visible to the visitors of a third-party website. But, unbeknown to the visitor,
most third-party websites utilize some services of these tech giants in the back-
ground, such as resources from a Content Delivery Network (CDN), widgets or
subscription to a business analytics service. When such a resource is loaded to the
browser while rendering the third-party web page, the cookie set by the tech giant is
automatically sent back to the web server with each new request. That reveals the
presence of the user at the speci¯c third-party site, thus allowing such services to
gather data on user's navigation across the internet. When using a browser appli-
cation provided by one of these tech giants, the exposure of the user data increases
even further, as the browser can monitor all interactions with websites, without
depending on the cookies. Using operating systems or hardware (e.g. phones, tablets)
provided by these tech-giant has the highest exposure, as the personally identi¯able
information are available at the operating system level.32 Previous research found
that 80% of Alexa's top one million websites were being tracked by Google,
while another found the percentage to be even higher at 97% among the top
100 websites.6,27
Business Analytic services such as Google Analytics (Universal Analytics) o®er
standard services free of cost to everybody, while charging a price for premium
services. The comprehensiveness of the insights sold as premium services depends on
their ability to track users across the entire internet.30,33 Therefore, many such
service providers o®er free services with limited features to users who are not willing
to pay for those services. This in turn will allow a provider to harvest comprehensive
set of user related data of a large customer base, that makes up the product which
will be marketed as a premium service.
Some of the free services that are o®ered by such operators are: web browsers,
e-mail services, cloud storage, business analytics, widgets such as counters, exchange
rate and weather information, CDN services, DNS services and others. The infor-
mation exploitation mantra is simple: place as many cookies on the client browsers as
possible by o®ering shared resources through CDNs or provide as many free services
as possible, since it will enable the service provider to place a cookie, and gather as
many \pings" along the way.





























































































This research carried out experiments on an A±liate Marketing Network (AMN)
within an e-commerce scenario. While some large e-commerce practitioners such as
e-bay, amazon.com, etc. manage the tracking process in-house, others choose to
entrust it to specialist tracking service providers, such as AMNs.
An AMN is a typical example of a large network of a±liates who generate web
tra±c for e-commerce sites. A±liates are popular websites based on diverse themes,
who already have a large audience of web tra±c. They agree to display advertise-
ments of e-commerce sites for a fee. Some advertisers pay a±liates a fee to simply
display an advertisement, while others may expect more visitor interactions such as
requiring a visitor to click on an advertisement and arrive at the e-commerce site. Yet
others pay a commission to a±liates, only if a visitor makes a purchase. A tracking
pixel of AMN will be placed on a±liate's webpage, which is usually a small piece of
JavaScript, which will cause the visit to be registered on the AMN's tracking server.
In case of commission-based advertising, another \conversion-pixel" is placed on the
e-commerce site's payment con¯rmation page, which will cause the AMN's tracking
server to register the total prices and the commission amounts due to the a±liate. In
spite of the transaction originating and ending at vastly di®erent web domains,
possibly over di®erent geographical locations and over a longer time span, the HTTP
cookie-based tracking process enables the AMN to accurately recognize the a±liate
who displayed the advertisement to the customer and reward the a±liate with the
correct amount of commission or fee.5,18–21
But there are instances that the cookie-based tracking process can fail.34 We
discuss some of those scenarios and investigate if the HTTP-based tracking process
can be made more robust by supplementing the HTTP cookie-based technology with
other technologies that we encountered in our previous research work.
3. Methodology
Information systems research falls broadly in two research paradigms: behavioral
research and design science research. The purpose of design science research is to
solve an existing industry problem by producing design artifacts as outputs.35–37 Our
research aims to solve an existing industry problem on how to make the online cross
domain tracking processes more robust while maintaining the tracking process
within bounds of technical necessities, thus avoiding privacy intrusions of internet
users.
3.1. Setting up of test environment
An experiment on cross-domain tracking (XDT) requires multiple domain-based
networks on separate IP segments that are interconnected with same network
technologies and topologies to simulate internet infrastructure. To track visitor-
interactions across multiple domains, all the domains being tracked require the




























































































ability to communicate with a mutually available central tracking domain. From the
XDT scenarios discussed above, a simulation of an A±liate Marketing Networks
(AMN) was chosen for this experiment, which comprises a minimum of four separate
domains. Such network allows us to test di®erent XDT-based technology imple-
mentations. The setup can simulate di®erent e-marketing models such as display
advertising, pay-per-click model (PPC) or revenue-sharing models such as cost-per-
acquisition (CPA). It can also be used to simulate business analytic services, CDN's
and other multi-domain transactions. Bespoke web applications abstracted to the
minimum requirements for each category of the four domains were created as part of
this research. Virtual servers were used to create a multi-domain network environ-
ment for all our experiments as shown in Fig. 1. Each domain-based virtual network
consisted of a Primary Domain Controller (PDC), Domain Name Server (DNS), a
Web Server, a Database Server. Each domain was connected via virtual network
infrastructure that allowed inter-domain routing using TCP-IP protocol. On com-
pletion of our experiments we created publicly accessible real-world web domains
with the same names, facilitating researchers to executes some of the tests.
The four categories of domains used in this experiment are described later in the
chapter. An XDT process starts with an internet user (domain 1: \Customer
domain"). When the internet user visits his favorite blog or special interest site
(domain 2: \A±liate"), which also displays third-party banner advertisements of
Fig. 1. Virtual Network Diagram.




























































































di®erent products, the visitor clicks on an advertisement. This click is ¯rst recorded
at a tracking service provider (domain 3: \Tracking domain"). Then it takes the
visitor to the e-commerce site that sells the product (domain 4: \e-commerce
domain"). In a real-world scenario, one e-commerce site uses more than one a±liate,
often in hundreds. Each a±liate has more than one visitor. Also, a tracking services
provider usually provides tracking services to more than one e-commerce site. To
experiment privacy intrusion and how a tracking provider can track a visitor in-
teraction across all the di®erent e-commerce sites that it provides services to, we need
the ability to create multiple instances of visitors, a±liates and e-commerce sites.
Using virtual machines, we were able to create as many instances from a master copy
of each category of domains. Each category was pre-con¯gured with bespoke soft-
ware, which we developed as part of this research, to carry out a speci¯c role.
Participating network domains were classi¯ed based on their functionalities
within an XDT scenario into four groups:
3.1.1. Tracking domain
Connex.net.nz domain was con¯gured as a tracking domain, which is at the center of
all the tracking activities in this study. The tracking server contained a bespoke
software that had the function and ability to track user activities within all other
e-commerce domains. \Pixel-codes" embedded in the webpages belonging to
e-commerce and e-marketing sites cause visitor-browsers to \ping" the tracking
server at connex.net.nz. This enabled us to test tracking service capabilities for
AMNs based on di®erent a±liate marketing models, e.g. display advertising, click
advertising and revenue-share advertising models. Di®erent service endpoints were
created to o®er di®erent services which are discussed later in this section.
3.1.2. E-commerce domains
Bestcars.ecopng.com, exploreasia.co.nz and ecovillagerundu.com domains were
con¯gured as e-commerce servers which subscribed to the tracking services provided
by connex.net.nz. Each e-commerce server contained a basic product display page,
with a shopping cart functionality. A \conversion-pixel" was placed on each pay-
ment con¯rmation page to track online purchases against \clicks" generated by
a±liates. VMs allowed creating multiple instances as needed, and multiple sub-
domains of the above three domains were used to host the newly created e-commerce
servers. Such con¯gurations were required for experiments that needed to observe
how tracking information from multiple unrelated e-commerce domains can be
shared, how it a®ects the privacy of web-visitors, and how the technical aspects of
XDT can be improved.
3.1.3. A±liate domains
NZtravelguide.org.nz, NewZealandTravel.net.nz domains and multiple sub-domains
were con¯gured as a±liates for the above e-commerce sites. Each A±liate site




























































































contained a landing page, with banner advertisements as \click-pixels. Each a±liate
instance was hosted on a di®erent network segment during experiments that required
multiple a±liates.
3.1.4. Internet-user domains
Computers and mobile devices were added to ICTresearch.co.nz domain represent-
ing a multitude of visitors using di®erent devices to access the internet. Devices of
this \Test" group were placed outside of all other domains. Devices using di®erent
operating systems, di®erent browsers, physical mobile devices, and mobile simula-
tions on desktop browsers were used to repeat each test within di®erent combina-
tions of above variables.
Above bespoke software for the e-commerce sites and for the tracking server were
developed as part of this research. This allowed the researchers to add and upgrade
functionality during the experiments to suit and incorporate any changing needs.
3.2. Test setup
The following test parameters were de¯ned to measure the success of cross-domain
tracking capability. Using HTTP-cookies, the following capabilities were ascertained
as a baseline for the test environment. Following seven tests were conducted:
Test 1: Loading a page or clicking a banner on any of the tracked pages of the
e-marketing domains causes a visit to be accurately registered on the tracking server.
Test 2: The ability for payment con¯rmation pages of e-commerce sites to
accurately and reliably transmit the a±liate identi¯er and total price of items pur-
chased to the tracking server. These two test capabilities encompass the tracking
process needed for an a±liate marketing network.
Test 3: Ability to simultaneously maintain visitor identity between two windows
of the same browser.
Test 4: Ability to simultaneously maintain visitor identity between two tabs
within the same window of a browser.
Test 5: Despite the \private browsing" mode of a browser, the tracking server has
ability to identify a user with a previously saved identi¯er instead of recording them
as a new user.
Test 6: Ability to identify a visitor uniquely when using di®erent browsers within
the same device. Usually, browsers do not share cookies, therefore will appear as a
new visitor for each browser.
Test 7: Ability to continue to identify a visitor even after the browser cookies are
deleted.
3.3. Privacy intrusion simulations
Only one instance of a tracking server (connex.net.nz) is required to track visitor
interactions across all participating domains and during all di®erent tests. Though




























































































one instance per each of the other three types of domains (e-commerce, a±liate and
visitor) is enough to experiment cross-domain tracking functionality, we have ex-
tended the experiment by adding multiple instances of each of the three categories.
Using multiple e-commerce domains allowed us to simulate a real-world A±liate
Marketing Network (AMN), which provides tracking services to multiple e-com-
merce sites. It further allowed us to simulate business analytics services such as
Google Analytics. The risks associated with rogue Content Delivery Networks
(CDN) were experimented using the same.
Di®erent con¯gurations were used to test hierarchical nature of services and as-
sociated information exposure. Minimum requirements of non-PII data required for
successful tracking was compared against PII data gathered in the process of business
analytics gathering.
4. Results
The results of the seven tests show, that \super cookie" concept.6,10 discussed in
previous research do not apply anymore at the same degree. Super cookie concept
was not one speci¯c technology, but a combination of technologies, when used in
tandem would result in an indestructible tracking solution that can be easily re-
spawned when deleted. Though they were e®ective a few years ago as they employ
technologies that were not originally meant for tracking purpose, later versions of
those technologies have made them partially ine®ective. Nevertheless, the partial
successes can still be utilized to create the tracking solutions more robust. Table 1
shows the status of current relevance.
4.1. Experiment using local storage
HTTP-cookie usage was disabled in this experiment. Our aim was to achieve similar
or more reliable tracking capability results, as de¯ned by the test parameters,
without the use of HTTP-cookies. As the data stored in the local storage is not
automatically sent back to the server, we need some extra e®ort to make it a part of
the client–server communication. All the communication between a webserver and
the local storage happens using a JavaScript ¯le that is attached to each tracked
Table 1. Currency of the new technologies as
tracking methods.
Cookies Local storage ETags
Test 1 Success Success Success
Test 2 Success Success Success
Test 3 Success Success Success
Test 4 Success Success Success
Test 5 Fail Fail Fail
Test 6 Fail Fail Fail
Test 7 Fail Fail Partial Success




























































































webpage. We tested the communication using asynchronous communication
(AJAX) when the web page contents need to be customized dynamically for each
visitor. When the unique identi¯er stored in the \Local Storage" is used only for
tracking process, it was saved into a hidden ¯eld within the webform and sent to the
server on the next post-back action.
4.2. Experiment using entity tags (ETags)
Unlike \Local storage", ETags are inherently a mode of communication between
server and client browsers, like HTTP-cookies. The cookie usage was disabled for this
experiment to simulate the tracking mechanism, by only using ETags.
Tracking-pixels were assigned with the URL of the tracking service. Click-pixels,
Conversion-pixels and other tracking-pixels caused the client browsers to send an
HTTP-request to the tracking server. As the ¯rst step, the server examines the
headers for an \If-None-Match header, which if present indicate the existence of a
tracking ETag. A unique identi¯er for each user was set as ETag, similar a cookie-
based tracking process. If the request header \If-None-Match" is not found, it
indicates the start of a new tracking process, in which case the server adds two new
headers to the HTTP-response: \Cache-control" header enabling caching on client
and \ETag" header with the visitor's unique identi¯er as the value.
The same ETag must be repeatedly set on every response during all subsequent
communication between the webserver and the client browser. Else, a response
without an ETag and Cache-Control header or a directive will cause the browser to
not use the previous browser cache, thereby losing the tracking capability of the
ETag.
4.3. Business insights gathering experiment
The above simulation environment setup for an AM network, allowed us to observe
the insights gathering process within an e-commerce environment. While functioning
as an AM tracking services provider, information was limited to gathered click-data
and matching conversion-data. The tracking process identi¯es the user only by a
unique numeric identi¯er. The IP address is unique during a session, but not over
longer durations, depending on the IP address leasing period of the DHCP server.
But the geographical location of the user is revealed by the IP address, which can be
matched with browser language to reveal the possible nationality or ethnicity of the
visitor. The ¯rst visit, and frequency of subsequent visits as well as successful
monetary outcomes, total purchase values, purchase per visit ratios could be cal-
culated using tracked data attributed to the unique identi¯er. By placing a tracking-
pixel in every page of the tracked site, we were able to monitor how long the visitor
spent on each page which allowed us to create information such as the most popular
pages, the most logical order of navigation, dead-locks that would usually cause the
visitor to leave the site, etc. Products perused, what category of products attracted
the most attention and the outcome are important business insights for a marketeer.




























































































At this level of tracking, despite knowing the approximate location, language and
buying habits, the visitor is only known by a number, without any PII.
Without any further changes to hardware or technology involved, we could ex-
tend the knowledge of the visitor-habits further and create even more marketable
information by extending our view beyond the tracked site. When the visitor
interacts with any other e-commerce or a±liate sites, that are subscribed to the same
tracking service, the \referrer" header of the HTTP request revealed the current
domain name, while the unique identi¯er remains the same across all the visited
domains. Any products that were perused at multiple domains gives away the cur-
rent urging purchase desire of the visitor. The knowledge of non-purchase at one site,
can be sold to the next site as a premium lead such as the \remarketing" leads
provided by many such services. Increasing the number of tracked domains by one
tracking services provider increases the details of a tracked user, thereby also in-
creasing the amount of marketable information. PII were still not available at this
level of tracking.
We extended our simulation setup by adding a new domain that was fully ac-
cessible to the tracking domain and introduced a homepage that required a user
account to access the site. That led to the ¯rst level of personal privacy intrusion, as
that enabled the tracking service to combine the anonymous user-persona that was
well-developed using the above- mentioned information, with a real person identi-
¯able with an email address. Names, addresses, a±liations or any other information
could be gathered in this process, depending on the motivation to lead a user to
provide additional data in exchange of services provided.
Instead of a local account that uses a user name and password, by o®ering the log-
in facility with Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter and similar authentication
providers, we can extract information associated with the user-pro¯le to further
enrich the tracked persona with information that appear in social media platforms.
While providing wider visibility of the persona, this provided a much higher level of
privacy intrusion. Converting the service provided by this new site to a social-media
site would allow us to gather even more multi-faceted information such as political,
social, environmental views and activities, family members and their activities, re-
cent places of visit, including exact current location, which indicates the highest level
of privacy intrusion.
5. Discussion
Unlike HTTP-cookies, the state management methods discussed here are not by
design, technologies invented for tracking purposes. Methods that automatically
transfer persisted identi¯ers back to the webserver with each HTTP-request, without
having to implement speci¯c code for such functionality, is a good candidate for
tracking purpose. It reduces the number of points of failure. By design, both HTTP-
cookie and ETags ful¯l this condition. Webservers set cookies or the ETags, and on
subsequent requests look for the cookies (by the name) or the ETags (by the value).




























































































It is the responsibility of the browser to return the unique identi¯er to the server,
with every request. In case of \Local Storage" it is not designed to send its values
back to the server. It is meant to be used by the code running on client browser.
Therefore, additional e®orts are required to extract the information from the local
storage and post it back to the server.
The \super cookie" concept and associated technologies were not designed to be
used for the purpose of tracking, therefore future developments and new releases of
those technologies can inadvertently make them unusable for tracking. As a tech-
nology that formed the super cookie concept \Adobe Flash Local shared objects"
commonly known as \Flash cookies" have been intentionally upgraded by Adobe, to
prevent them from being used as tracking technologies. Further, most browsers have
by default, disabled access to °ash content and require user's explicit permission.
Reference 6 found that ETag retained their identi¯er values even when the cookies
were blocked in a browser and when using \Private browsing mode". Results of the
above experiments show that all the browsers now block ETags and Local storage, in
both of the above scenarios. Therefore, keeping abreast with current developments of
these technologies will enable researchers to adapt to these changes and modify the
techniques to stay ahead of these changing technologies.
However, as seen in the results in Table 1, tracking capabilities using \Local
Storage" perform equally well as HTTP-cookie-based traditional tracking technol-
ogies. Most common browsers have visual indicators on the browser window to show
the use of HTTP-cookies within a site. For example, Chrome has a small cookie icon
at the end of the URL address bar at the top of the windows. On clicking it, even the
least-tech savvy users can delete or even block the cookies to that speci¯c site,
thereby failing the tracking process within that browser completely. In contrary, the
use of local storage is not as visible to the user; therefore, to view the data in the local
storage, requires user to dig deeper, such as use the \Developer Tools" that are
accessible to users with more technical sophistication. Nevertheless, deleting HTTP-
cookies now deletes local storage too, in newer versions of modern browsers.
ETags have an advantage over the other two methods, as ETag values are meant
for the caching engines and therefore not easily visible to the general user. Also, the
tools that are readily accessible on the user interface to remove or block cookies, do
not delete the ETags, though they a®ect both the HTTP-cookies and local storage.
But by removing browsing data including cache history, all identi¯ers can be
removed.
Though we have displayed how these methods could be used without using
cookies, for tracking purpose, we do not consider them as alternatives for HTTP-
cookies. We recommend using cookies as the primary means for tracking, while using
other methods in combination to make the process more robust.
The experiments above also veri¯ed the often-unintended information breaches.
Following data security breaches and privacy threats were simulated during fol-
lowing technology usage scenarios, which are common in personal and business
environments.




























































































5.1. Tracking data spillage
With the above setup, we were able to simulate the complete tracking process to
demonstrate di®erent a±liate marketing models; cost-per-click (CPC), cost-per-mille
(CPM) and cost-per-acquisition (CPA). The range of information exposed to the
tracking service provider was observed. E-commerce practitioners who subscribe to
the services of an AMN expect the AMN to monitor only transactions belonging to
a±liate-generated web tra±c. Instead, as the tracking pixel is placed on the payment
con¯rmation page and a con¯rmation page is sent to every customer at the end of a
payment, it triggered the conversion tracking process for every transaction. This
includes information related to visitors who came through organic searches, paid
advertising, search-engine advertising and every other tra±c generation method.
The tracking server can easily di®erentiate the AM generated tra±c from non-AM
tra±c by the presence of an accompanying HTTP-cookie, which has been placed by
the tracking server during click-tracking process. In an AM scenario, all web tra±c
that does not have a tracking cookie will be ignored by the tracking server and
classi¯ed as non-AM generated tra±c. However, enterprises are unaware that the
tracking service has the capability of capturing all online purchases of the subscribed
e-commerce practitioners.
This information leakage worsens with the popular practice of using services such
as \Google Tag Manager", where e-commerce sites link their pixel-code via the Tag
Manager URL instead of triggering directly on the tracking server. This exposes all
online sales data to two di®erent service providers, both of whom could use that
information to generate additional value-added services, that are useful for the
marketing e®orts of competitors. For instance, remarketing sales leads that are of-
fered at a higher price are based on the information on unsuccessful sales at com-
petitors' e-commerce sites, since tracking service providers have visibility over
customer interactions within all sites that have subscribed to their services. As
Google services have wider visibility across most of the internet, using a single cus-
tomer identi¯er across all sites, each customer's online interactions can be easily
linked up to create a comprehensive behavioral pro¯le. Some business managers who
are uninformed about the information security breaches and the associated dis-
advantages choose to ignore security risk over the convenience of analytics (when
their sales data are combined with the rest of business analytics data).
Tracking process for business analytics requires a tracking pixel to be embedded
in every webpage that needs tracking. This triggers a tracking event with each step of
the way during a browsing session, allowing an enterprise to gather a rich set of
behavioral data of their customers. With a single User ID feature Google's Universal
Analytics can track a user across multiple devices (e.g. phone, tablet, laptop, desk-
top, etc.) and across all participating sites in to one browsing pro¯le, which makes
the data very insightful to a practitioner.7,38 Google's Universal Analytics guidelines
make end-user privacy policy explicitly a practitioner's responsibility. Their terms
and conditions state: \When you implement Universal Analytics, it is your




























































































responsibility to ensure that your use is legally compliant, including with any local or
regional requirements for speci¯c noti¯cation to users".39
5.2. CDN exposure
We created a service endpoint on tracking server to serve a JavaScript library
simulating the common use of JavaScript libraries from public CDNs. Web pages
were created within the Dev domain that had links to those JavaScript libraries
within their headers. Some pages were setup to use \Local Storage" as tracking
technology in place of HTTP-cookies.9,16
CDNs are popular among web developers to reduce network latency. It is also
common practice to link to most of the popular JavaScript libraries, CSS ¯les and
font ¯les through CDNs. A compromised JavaScript ¯le can provide control and
access to sensitive data within a page, or in \Local Storage" and user inputs. Our
tests were able to steal the visitor IDs from Local Storage, hidden ¯elds on forms,
change DOM elements, etc. Other static content providing CDNs can be used to stu®
cookies, as discussed in cookie stu±ng fraud in AM.2
5.3. Click-bait
Some YouTube videos, social media posts and links to blogs on diverse topics that
appear as non-advertising material to site visitors can deliver harmful content
without warning or consent.40 Those links can direct visitors to servers that may
place tracking cookies, display or simulate \clicks" on advertisements and undertake
similar nefarious activities invisible to the visitor. To simulate this scenario, multiple
endpoints were created on the tracking server that serves pure HTML content to the
caller. Each of the endpoint URLs were posted to multiple test machines in Dev test
domain simulating posts in social media networks. When a post was read or a
comment was added using a client browser, the endpoint serving the HTML content
was able to place a \connex.net.nz" cookie on the client machine. The main re-
quirement for a successful tracking process is to place a cookie with a unique iden-
ti¯er during the ¯rst visit of a user. During all subsequent visits to any websites
tracked by the said tracking server, the cookie will be sent back to the tracking
server, by the client browser, thus identifying itself.
This collated information is su±cient for Cambridge Analytica style service
providers to o®er targeted campaigns in multitude of areas such as sales campaigns,
political, social, environmental campaigns, etc to in°uence people's opinions.29 With
the combination of the two above-discussed datasets, despite having a quite clear
picture of the persona, we still cannot personally identify the person in real-world.
5.4. OAuth
With this test, we created an application with \oAuth" or OpenID style authori-
zation and access delegation service, as often found using Facebook, Google, Twitter,




























































































etc. Though applications can request access to additional features connected to the
user account, such as their complete name, access to contact list, etc., even with only
the basic information as login name, it is possible to give a name and a face to
the hitherto anonymous but comprehensive digital persona that we have created
previously.
5.5. Privacy woes vs. technological necessities
As users, privacy groups and countries are getting more concerned about privacy and
user rights, more regional and local regulations such as GDPR.13 are being imple-
mented that restrict online tracking activities. Tracking activities can be divided into
three categories and each category of tracking has di®erent levels of privacy impli-
cations therefore should be addressed di®erently:
(1) Purely technical: Tracking process used in A±liate Marketing as discussed above
falls into this category. E-marketing methods necessitate the ability to track a
visitor from the source of the web tra±c generation up to completion of trans-
action. No personally identi¯able information (PII) is gathered in the process, it
only uses a unique identi¯er assigned to each user. A \click-pixel" in advertise-
ment-carrying pages and one \conversion-pixel" in payment-con¯rmation page
are the only tracking requirement for this kind of tracking service. This mode of
tracking does not create privacy concerns to the users, therefore new regulations
and policies need to consider the importance current and future technological
needs of this category of tracking and state management.
(2) Non-PII-based: The tracking process used by business analytic services fall into
this category. The data gathering process goes well beyond the sheer technical
necessity for e-commerce, as more comprehensive behavioral information is
gathered for marketing purposes.18,41 Though the identity of the user is not
known to the tracking service, a comprehensive digital persona can be created
using the gathered behavioral information across the Internet. Service providers
can act upon that information by displaying targeted advertisements or speci¯c
political, religious and social content to in°uence them as in the case of Cam-
bridge Analytica.29 This can be harmful and detrimental to the unsuspecting
user.
This category can span from harmless and non-privacy intrusive services to
information-scavenging nefarious operators. At the lower end of the scale are the
e-marketing tracking service providers such as AMNs mentioned in the previous
group, but who may have sought to venture a little deeper into information
gathering process than required to operate as a purely tracking technology op-
erator. At the opposite end of the scale are entities gathering business intelligence
who are operating closer to the boarder of the next group described. Web
scraping and web crawling activities form an important part of their activities.
They usually o®er free services and tools, so that they can place tracking cookies




























































































into the browsers of unsuspecting visitors. They may get people to sign up for a
free service by ¯lling out forms requesting personally identi¯able data such as
names, contact e-mails, etc or, they may even ask site-visitors to sign in with
social media credentials, which would allow them to link the anonymous digital
personas they have created with a real name and a face. These service providers
usually take a bottom-up approach into user pro¯le creation, which means, they
¯rst gather many pieces of behavioral information of people without knowing the
exact identity of the person. When they have gathered su±cient data to create a
digital persona that is seemingly unique, it will be attempted connect the real-
world identity to the anonymous persona. One of the major di®erences between
this category and PII-based category is that the service providers at this level do
not have a product or service that has a global reach.
(3) PII based: Providers of this category are set apart from the other two categories
due to one or more products or services that they have with a global reach. The
global reach is important, because with that millions of customers around the
globe will have an account with the provider. They will gather PIIs of the users at
the time of opening their accounts with the provider. This will allow the provider
to gather behavioral data on that person, over time. This is a top-down approach
for user pro¯le creation, where ¯rst the person is positively identi¯ed, and then
over time, behavioral data is accumulated. Microsoft, Apple, Google, Facebook,
Twitter, LinkedIn, and other social media companies fall into this category.33,42
Most people have an account with one or more services of these tech giants.
A few other common characteristics of these providers are that their product
o®erings are delivered across multiple hardware platforms such as wearables,
mobile phones, tablets, laptops and desktops. That provides uninterrupted
connectivity to the user, and continuous tracking capability to the service pro-
vider. Microsoft, Apple and Google have the advantage of operating system level
identity knowledge.43 The next best preferable method would be browser level
identi¯cation, through which a user's browsing data can be collected. Though
popular browsers like Chrome can be used without logging into it, users may be
aware, browser's continuous reminder to log-in to the browser, which makes
tracking easier for the browser manufacturer. Even if tech-savvy users know that
they are constantly tracked while being logged-in to these tech giants, users
choose to stay logged in, due to convenience.
6. Future Direction
It can be rightfully expected that any future developments to state-management
technologies such as HTTP cookies would still adhere to the requirement of XDT.
Further research e®orts could increase the robustness of the tracking technology by
supplementing existing cookie-based tracking technology with alternative non-tra-
ditional technologies. In this research, we have used stateful tracking technologies. It
will be useful to investigate how stateless tracking technologies can add to the




























































































robustness of the above tracking methods.8,9,16 As those alternative technologies
keep changing their capability to be used as a tracking technology, continuous
research e®orts are needed to adapt to those changes that can drive the e±cacy of
cross-domain tracking capabilities.
Policy developers need to consider each of these tracking scenario categories in-
dividually and holistically during policy development, as more and more countries
are currently developing country and region-speci¯c regulations. European GDPR
has frustrated and caused click-fatigue among users, that many have been often
clicking \accept" for want of a better option.14 If the policies are not well thought
out, it only adds to more bureaucracy without achieving intended results.12
Further research could be carried out to develop a framework that will translate
higher level privacy requirements in layman's terms to pre-agreed technical imple-
mentation categories, that should be implemented during the negotiation of the
connection between the web server and the client browser. Though every browser has
a settings page, the current settings do not translate to universally accepted tech-
nical de¯nitions. User's choice of tracking capabilities based on the capabilities and
categories discussed above can be translated to speci¯c implementations. When
adhered to by web servers, browsers and web application developers, click-fatigue
can be avoided, which is due to the current necessity to make those choices on a
site-by-site basis, at every site.
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